Sooner or later, as the rhetoric over Boko Haram’s bigoted objectives shifted back and forth, the violent sect was bound to overreach itself.
It crossed that threshold of public forbearance last Friday when it took on Kano in a bloody showdown that reverberated far beyond the borders of Nigeria.
About 200 lives were lost, not to talk of large scale destruction of property and the intolerable strain it put on the delicate bond of unity that keeps the country together.
While the sect’s violent methods and locales of attack have attracted attention and worry, the most notable thing about it is how its style and objectives have caused disagreement and even friction in and out of government on how to tackle the sect’s menace.
Boko Haram, a Salafist Muslim sect that became jihadist in 2009, was founded around 2002.
It promotes separatism based on ethnic and sectarian intolerance, and is the leading proponent of terror in Nigeria today.
It has survived three governments since it launched its fiery activities, and, whether directly or indirectly, is believed to be responsible for the death of nearly a thousand people, most of them Nigerians.
Originally based in the Northeast, it is gradually extending its areas of operation to the Northwest, and also threatening the peace and stability of the country.
Until last week, the north and the Federal Government were both ambivalent towards the group, uncertain whether to use strong-arm tactics against it or to dialogue.
While Kano was thoroughly shaken and disgusted by the scale of Boko Haram’s irrational and indiscriminate killings last week, the Nigerian Army appears to be completely exasperated with the general pussyfooting over what methods to adopt in tackling the problem.
Two days ago, at a seminar on national security in Abuja, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika, publicly suggested that negotiation with the sect be ruled out.
It is not known how the government would react to the public suggestion from a group that should ordinarily take orders from the government, or at worst give private counsel.
However, the army seems to accurately reflect the mood of majority of Nigerians who patriotically feel that Boko Haram’s operations were leading Nigeria into a secessionist war.
Though military operation in urbanised terrain is a difficult proposition, the army is right to seek unified approach to fighting, not negotiating with, the menace.
It should, however, go a step further by training and retraining its men in psychological operations in order to limit collateral damage from urban warfare and also to win the populace to its side.
On its own, the government should see the counsel coming from the army as a timely and welcome one.
The President recently said the sect had infiltrated the government and security agencies.
It must now intelligently lead the battle to rid the government and security agencies of infiltrators.
If it does not, it should not hope to win the war that has brought the country perilously close to disintegration.
It crossed that threshold of public forbearance last Friday when it took on Kano in a bloody showdown that reverberated far beyond the borders of Nigeria.
About 200 lives were lost, not to talk of large scale destruction of property and the intolerable strain it put on the delicate bond of unity that keeps the country together.
While the sect’s violent methods and locales of attack have attracted attention and worry, the most notable thing about it is how its style and objectives have caused disagreement and even friction in and out of government on how to tackle the sect’s menace.
Boko Haram, a Salafist Muslim sect that became jihadist in 2009, was founded around 2002.
It promotes separatism based on ethnic and sectarian intolerance, and is the leading proponent of terror in Nigeria today.
It has survived three governments since it launched its fiery activities, and, whether directly or indirectly, is believed to be responsible for the death of nearly a thousand people, most of them Nigerians.
Originally based in the Northeast, it is gradually extending its areas of operation to the Northwest, and also threatening the peace and stability of the country.
Until last week, the north and the Federal Government were both ambivalent towards the group, uncertain whether to use strong-arm tactics against it or to dialogue.
While Kano was thoroughly shaken and disgusted by the scale of Boko Haram’s irrational and indiscriminate killings last week, the Nigerian Army appears to be completely exasperated with the general pussyfooting over what methods to adopt in tackling the problem.
Two days ago, at a seminar on national security in Abuja, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika, publicly suggested that negotiation with the sect be ruled out.
It is not known how the government would react to the public suggestion from a group that should ordinarily take orders from the government, or at worst give private counsel.
However, the army seems to accurately reflect the mood of majority of Nigerians who patriotically feel that Boko Haram’s operations were leading Nigeria into a secessionist war.
Though military operation in urbanised terrain is a difficult proposition, the army is right to seek unified approach to fighting, not negotiating with, the menace.
It should, however, go a step further by training and retraining its men in psychological operations in order to limit collateral damage from urban warfare and also to win the populace to its side.
On its own, the government should see the counsel coming from the army as a timely and welcome one.
The President recently said the sect had infiltrated the government and security agencies.
It must now intelligently lead the battle to rid the government and security agencies of infiltrators.
If it does not, it should not hope to win the war that has brought the country perilously close to disintegration.
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